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Reining in the American Litigator:
The New Role of American Judges
By RICHARD L. MARCUS*
American litigation has often gained the attention of the world.
Three years ago, for example, the $145 billion award against the
tobacco industry in a Florida court was front-page news in Japan, at
least in the English language papers. In achieving such outcomes, the
American lawyer has long seemed unique in the world-almost a
cowboy figure doing justice against the odds. In the Florida case, for
example, the plaintiffs' lawyer was quoted as saying, "It was a day of
reckoning. This was never about money alone. This was about
showing those companies up for what they are. ' '2 In the same vein, a
* Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. This paper was prepared for, and presented during, the June 1, 2003,
conference of the Japan Association of the Law of Civil Procedure, on the evolving
techniques of judging in different countries.
1. See, e.g., Smokers Awarded $145 Billion in Florida From Tobacco Firms,
JAPAN TIMES, July 16, 2000, at 1 (reproducing Marc Kaufman, Tobacco Suit Award:
$145 Billion; Fla. Jury Hands Industry Major Setback, WASH. POST, July 15, 2000, at
Al). In 2003, that punitive damages verdict was overturned. See Gary Young, A
Huge Win For the Companies, But the Impact is Debated, NAT'L L.J., May 26, 2003, at
Al (describing reversal by Florida Court of Appeal).
Stories about American litigation continue to appear in papers in Japan. See
Alex Berenson, Lawsuits Give Drug Firms Bigger Headaches, INT'L HERALD-
TRIBUNE/ASAHI SHIMBUN, May 20, 2003, at 13 (describing increase in suits in the
United States against drug makers).
2. Kaufman, supra note 1. Similarly, a more recent newspaper article about
American suits, published in Japan, said that "top plaintiffs' lawyers in the United
States have trained their sights on drugmakers," seeking to supplant federal
regulators:
In some instances, teams of plaintiffs' lawyers are spending several million dollars
preparing cases for trial in hope of winning billions of dollars in settlements and jury
verdicts against the drug companies, which have some of the deepest pockets among
U.S. corporations.
The lawyers pursuing the suits say that the food and drug agency has failed to
protect patients from dangerous drugs and that the companies have tried to hide side
effects. But the agency says medicines are safer now than they have ever been.
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recent book about the plaintiff attorneys who successfully sued the
tobacco industry was entitled Civil Warriors
This vision of the American lawyer has captivated movie makers,
TV producers, and many others (including a significant segment of
the public). To a singular extent, American lawyers are at the center
of important events in the United States. For example, the Wall
Street Journal recently reported on the suit filed by famed plaintiffs'
lawyer Ronald Motley against an array of prominent Saudi Arabians,
accusing them of providing financial support for the September 11
terrorists.4 The U.S. government has expressed concern that this suit
could upset U.S.-Saudi relations, but Motley responded, "[t]he fact
that it complicates the life of some baggy-britches Foggy Bottom guy
[a reference to U.S. diplomats] is not my concern."5  Other suits
brought by private lawyers have prompted a similar reaction by the
State Department.6
The American judge, on the other hand, has remained a
background figure, rarely taking the initiative and serving instead as a
passive, impartial umpire in the contest of the lawyers. In many other
countries, the judge seems more in control. For example, when
proceedings in Spain were brought against former President Pinochet
of Chile, they were initiated and pursued by a judge, not by a lawyer.
In much of the world, the tradition has been for the judge to gather
evidence and refine the case, albeit acting on the "suggestions" of the
lawyers.
During the last half-century, however, the latitude accorded the
American lawyer has increasingly been reined in by American judges.
Although there has been resistance to this trend, it shows no signs of
abating. This paper attempts to portray the background and
evolution of this trend. It begins with a very general sketch of the
role of attorneys in U.S. society and government, and then examines
the procedural features of American litigation until the mid-twentieth
Berenson, supra note 1.
3. DAN ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS: THE LEGAL SIEGE ON THE TOBACCO
INDUSTRY (2000).
4. Milo Gevelin & Jess Bravin, Litigating Terror: Tobacco Lawyer Fights Saudis
in a Sept. 11 Suit, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 12, 2002, at Al.
5. See id.
6. See id. (reporting that the State Department has asked a judge to dismiss
another suit, this one against ExxonMobil Corp. concerning atrocities allegedly
committed by Indonesian troops guarding an Exxon facility in that country. The
State Department said that this suit "'would risk a potentially serious adverse impact
on significant relations related directly to the ongoing struggle against terrorism."').
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century, which placed primary emphasis on the lawyers. It then
explains how both procedural changes and substantive shifts
prompted increased judicial supervision, which came to be known as
managerial judging. It concludes by reviewing American objections
to these shifts.
I. The Distinctive Role of American Lawyers
In the early nineteenth century, de Tocqueville was struck by the
prominence of lawyers and law in the young American nation.7
Lawyers dominated much of the design of American political
institutions, and court cases often addressed critical issues. Several
American presidents-Lincoln is a leading example-were lawyers as
well as politicians. On the frontier of the new nation, in particular,
becoming a lawyer was a significant method for upward mobility.
Again, Lincoln is an example. Although the closing of the American
frontier at the end of the nineteenth century supposedly ended an
epoch in the country's history,8 some of that spirit lives on. As The
Economist magazine recently noted, "[t]he concept of the frontier,
long dead in other countries, still matters in America."9
It is something of a stretch to link this background with modem
American litigation, but the prominence of the frontiersman image is
still coveted by American lawyers: "They see themselves as
'equalizers' who roam through American society looking for injustice,
taking the side of victimized individuals against large, uncaring
institutions and in the process making a lot of money. Plaintiff
lawyers are mavericks who, as one of them put it, 'personify the
American Dream.""... Obviously this is not true of all American
lawyers, but it provides a salient piece of background for the attitude
7. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 248 (J.P. Mayer &
M. Lerner, eds., 1966) ("There is hardly a political question in the United States
which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.").
8. See FREDERICK J. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
Professor Turner argued that the "closing" of the American frontier in 1890 marked
the end of an epoch in American history during which Americans dissatisfied with
their lots could always pull up stakes and head for the frontier. The availability of
this option, in turn, had fostered democracy and individualism, Turner concluded.
9. The Magnificent Seven, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8,2003, at 14.
10. THOMAS BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 48 (2002).
Similarly, a recent article in the American Bar Association Journal explained that
"plaintiffs' lawyers tend to think of themselves as wielding the laser sword battling
the forces of darkness." Terry Carter, Offense and Defense, A.B.A.J., June, 2003, at
42.
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toward restricting lawyers' freedom of action.
As a further matter of background-and contrast to other
countries-another important feature of American lawyers is that
they often received limited formal education. Even today,
"[c]ompared to England and Canada, the United States has fewer
entry restrictions to the practice of law and a much larger number of
lawyers per capita."" Certainly the obstacles confronting those who
want to become lawyers in Japan are a great deal higher. In the
nineteenth century, becoming a lawyer in the United States was much
easier than it is today. Lincoln, for instance, did so through
independent reading followed by apprenticeship to an experienced
attorney. Little formal education was required. In the early
twentieth century, formal legal education became more prominent,
and there was a major controversy about whether it should be
extended from two years to three, and whether law students should
first be required to attend college. 2 Early on, American lawyering
displayed a democratic and egalitarian spirit that is bolstered by the
frontiersman image and probably is absent in other countries.
Control over lawyers by the "elite" members of the profession-the
judges-would cut somewhat against this spirit.
The right to jury trial also contributed to the democratic and
egalitarian spirit of American litigation. Rather than focusing mainly
on a legally-trained judge, the American lawyer often had to pitch his
arguments to a jury made of what were truly his peers-also largely
self-educated people. Although the judge had some authority to take
a case from a jury or reject the decision reached by a jury, this
authority was quite limited. Advocates of the jury trial resisted
efforts to expand the judge's authority. In 1943, for example, Justice
Black, a strong proponent of jury trial (and a former trial lawyer),
denounced a decision of the Supreme Court as "a continuation of the
gradual process of judicial erosion which in one hundred fifty years
has slowly worn away a major portion the essential [right to jury trial]
guarantee of the Seventh Amendment."13
11. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts
the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 984 (2000).
12. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICAN FROM
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, Ch. 10 (1983) (describing the controversy that attended
increased requirements for formal education for lawyers).
13. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
Current assumptions about the former limits on the judge's ability to alter the jury's
decision may not sufficiently appreciate the latitude the judge enjoyed in the distant
[27:3
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American judges, too, were distinctive. Rather than emerging
from professional training directed toward service in the judiciary,
they came usually from the practicing bar, and, like other lawyers,
often had limited formal education. They surely did not rise through
a judicial bureaucracy. There was, indeed, no judicial bureaucracy in
which to advance. To the contrary, judges were either elected or
appointed by others (presidents or governors) who had been elected.
Perhaps as a consequence of their backgrounds and the way in which
they were selected, "the American judiciary, precisely because it is
politically responsive and less formalistic is more pragmatic, quicker
to invent new rights and remedies, and more willing to adapt the law
to changing circumstances and new justice claims." ' Thus:
Compared to most national judiciaries, American judges are less
constrained by legal formalisms; they are more policy oriented,
more attentive to the equities (and inequities) of the particular
situation. In the decentralized American legal system, if one judge
closes the door on a novel legal argument, claimants can often find
a more receptive judge in another court.5
Because they were former lawyers themselves and accustomed to the
broad-ranging activities of attorneys, judges would ordinarily not be
inclined to curtail the lawyers' latitude.
Taken together, these features served to magnify the importance
of the individual lawyer. Not only would one wanting to be a lawyer
confront low barriers to entry, he could pitch his arguments largely to
a lay jury, and perhaps find an inventive judge with a background
similar to his own, who might also respond to the equity of the
lawyer's case. In such a system, constraints on the lawyer would meet
with a cold reception.
A final feature of the American experience that bears on this
overall picture of the crusading pursuer of right is the distinctive
American reliance on private enforcement of public norms. Where
other countries might entrust such enforcement largely to
bureaucracies, that has not been in keeping with the American
inclination, particularly in recent years:
past. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV.
587, 592 (2001) (arguing that "pre-modern federal control of juries by the elaboration
of law, the direction of verdicts, and the liberal use of commentary on the evidence
along with new trials likely exceeded the overall level of modern judicial controls").
14. ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 112 (2001).
15. Id. at 16.
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Between 1964 and 1977, in a truly extraordinary surge of activity,
Congress passed twenty-five major environmental and civil rights
acts, plus far-reaching statutes regulating workplace safety,
consumer lending, product safety, private pension funds, and local
public education. At the same time, Congress was reluctant-for
political, fiscal, and constitutional reasons-to create huge federal
bureaucracies, with offices in every metropolitan area, to enforce
all these demanding regulatory programs.... Armed with those
rights, individual victims of injustice and energetic reform lawyers
could act as "private attorneys general," bringing lawsuits against
state and local governments for half-hearted implementation of
federal laws, or they could sue regulated businesses directly. To
energize the private attorneys general, Congress enacted scores of
one-way fee-shifting statutes, which enabled successful plaintiffs to
recover lawyers' fees from government and corporate defendants
but did not require them, if they lost, to pay the defendants' lawyers
bills.
In sum, whereas European polities generally rely on
hierarchically organized national bureaucracies to hold local
officials accountable to national policies, the U.S. Congress
mobilized a distinctly American army of enforcers-a
decentralized, ideologically motivated array of private advocacy
groups and lawyers.
6
Although this sketch is undoubtedly oversimplified, it introduces
the distinctive background for considering judicial control of litigation
in the United States. Not only might greater judicial control run
against the grain of fiercely independent American lawyers, it could
also be criticized as curtailing the enforcement capacity of those
lawyers.
II. American Procedure Before the Federal Rules
The latitude American federal judges could wield over litigation
was a matter of concern to some who shaped the U.S. Constitution.
For a long time, there were constraints on their latitude, as explained
by an American academic unnerved by the recent rise of judicial
supervision of litigation:
16. Id. at 47. For a criticism of the actual operation of this approach, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 214 (1983) (pointing up flaws in the
behavior of private attorneys general, and arguing that these flaws resulted from
intrinsic features of the American handling of this activity).
[27:3
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[A]t the beginning of the 19th Century, the authority of federal trial
court judges was subject to three significant checks. First,
precedent and statute limited the primary discretion of judges.
Unlike legislators, judges did not have unlimited discretion to
exercise their authority as they saw fit. Second, in place of the
interbranch checks that guarded against the abuse of executive and
legislative power, the system of appellate review provided an
intrabranch check on the power of federal trial court judges.
Finally, the institution of the jury trial and the constitutional and
statutory provisions created to preserve its continued validity
checked judicial authority by allowing public participation in the
fact-finding process of the federal courts.
For almost one hundred and fifty years, the checks on the power
of federal trial court judges continued to operate as effective
restraints on the arbitrary exercise of power. Precedent, appellate
review, and the jury trial effectively limited the scope of trial court
discretion. Indeed, if one check waned, another compensated for it.
For example, trial courts in the nineteenth century began to
exercise an increasing amount of control over the jury through the
development of strict rules of evidence and control over the
sufficiency of evidence through directed verdicts and new trial
orders. At the same time that trial courts began to regulate trials
more elaborately, "Appellate courts kept pace, creating new
procedures and scrutinizing trial courts' use of them." As trial
courts regulated juries, appellate courts established precedent to
govern the new trial court powers and regularly reviewed the
exercise of trial court authority on appeal.17
Others report that by the early twentieth century reformers
sought to curtail the power of lawyers and the role of the jury. 8 But
structural features of American civil litigation, as well as judicial
practices and expectations, limited such efforts to control the lawyers
to the trial phase.
The structural aspect had to do with the assignment of cases.
Most metropolitan courts had numerous judges and operated on what
17. Todd Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 41, 59-60 (1995) (quoting Stephen
Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L.
REV. 631, 641-42).
18. 21 CHARLES WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, § 5005 at 79 (1977) (describing the early twentieth century view that the
trial "should be firmly under the control of the only unbiased expert in the
courtroom-the trial judge").
2003]
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was called the master calendar system. This system meant that judges
were assigned different tasks: some would be responsible for handling
pretrial motions; others would handle civil trials; still others would
handle criminal trials; and a presiding judge would have responsibility
to assign tasks among the other judges. Under this system, a given
case might come under the control of numerous judges should various
matters arise. A motion would be heard by the assigned law and
motion judge, but a later motion might go to a different law and
motion judge. Setting the case for trial would come under the
authority of the presiding judge. And the judge who tried the case
would likely not have any contact with it until it was assigned for trial
shortly before the trial was to begin. Consequently, there was no
structure for supervising what the lawyers did until the trial was
imminent.
The judicial practices and expectations that constrained judicial
restraint of lawyers were consistent with a judicial attitude that the
case should be left to the lawyers until trial. Accordingly, a judge
would ordinarily have no contact with pending civil cases unless a
motion was made. Because of the demanding fact pleading
requirements of many American jurisdictions, these motions might
effectively constrain lawyers whose cases were found unsatisfactory
on the pleadings. Except for that restraint, it would be unusual for a
judge to interfere with the lawyers' activities until trial approached.
III. Expansion of Attorneys' Procedural Latitude Under the
Federal Rules
Although the prevailing attitude of judges was to leave the
control of litigation to the lawyers, the apparatus the lawyers had at
their command underwent a metamorphosis in the mid-twentieth
century. Before that time, strict fact pleading requirements tended to
limit the claims that could be made in court and constrict the suit to
rather specific allegations." The prohibition against "variance"
limited the ability of lawyers to alter the position spelled out in their
pleadings.
More significantly, the litigation apparatus gave lawyers few
levers to prepare their cases for trial. Daniel Webster, the famed
lawyer and legislator of the mid-nineteenth century, summed it up as
follows: "If he would be a great lawyer, he must first consent to
19. For background, see Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433 (1986).
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become a great drudge., 20 And that drudgery was investigation, not
discovery. Investigation was, and is, relatively immune from intrusive
judicial oversight.21 But because there was no form of compulsion a
lawyer could use to pursue an investigation, it was also limited by the
willingness of any source of information to cooperate.
The solution to this problem, of course, would be to use formal
discovery. But that was difficult until the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Federal Rules or Rules) were adopted in 1938. Very
limited discovery was allowed in the courts of many states, but under
the widespread Field Code, the principal device for revealing the
ground for claims or defenses was precise pleadings.22 Federal courts,
meanwhile, generally followed state court procedure. But federal
courts often did not permit even the limited discovery that was
available in state court.' The Supreme Court signaled its disapproval
of broad discovery in a 1911 case in which it denounced any effort by
a party "to pry into the case of his adversary to learn its strength or
weakness" as a "fishing bill.,
24
The adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 worked a major
change in the latitude available to lawyers in the pretrial phase. One
reason was the loosening of pleading requirements. The Rules
replaced the fact pleading requirement with what has been called
notice pleading, which greatly relaxed the requirements for setting
forth a claim or defense.25 Not only did the pleadings not have to set
forth in a precise way the grounds for a claim or defense, the Rules
also provided a very liberal opportunity for amendment so that a
party could change allegations during the case, even during the trial.26
20. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 330
(3d ed. 2000).
21. See, e.g., Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc., 142 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a district court judge could not require plaintiff's lawyer to notify
defendants of interviews with prospective witnesses, even though these interviews
were under oath and recorded by a court recorder, because they were nevertheless
not formal depositions).
22. Stephen Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 696-97 (1998).
23. Id. at 698-701.
24. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911).
25. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 495 (1957) (stating that "a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
relief"); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that complaint need only contain a "short
and plain statement of the claim, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief").
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (amendment before trial); FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b)
20031
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This change made U.S. pleading much less demanding than that in
most other countries.2 Thus, even if the lawyer did not know of the
claim or defense at the outset, it would be possible later to include it
if discovery revealed additional grounds.
The truly dramatic change, however, was the great expansion of
discovery. Contrasted to the very limited discovery that had been
allowed previously, the new Federal Rules accomplished a
revolutionary change. As Professor Subrin explained:
If one adds up all the types of discovery permitted in individual
state courts [before the Federal Rules were adopted], one finds
some precursors to what later became discovery under the Federal
Rules; but.., no one state allowed the total panoply of devices.
Moreover, the Federal Rules, as they became law in 1938,
eliminated features of discovery that in some states had curtailed
the scope of discovery and the breadth of its use.28
To quote Professor Hazard: "This system of pretrial discovery is
unique to the United States."29 He elaborates: "[R]ecognizing in a
party a right to require production of evidence, as distinct from a
party's right to ask the court to require production of evidence,
violates a constitutional principle of adjudication in the civil law
system. '3 For our purposes, discovery under the Federal Rules
endows the lawyers with an extraordinarily broad method of using
judicial authority to extract information from parties and from
nonparties.31 And the Supreme Court did an about-face on "fishing
expeditions" in 1947, thirty-six years after it had denounced them in
1911: "No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition'
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
(amendment during or after trial).
27. As an illustration of this difference, consider Rule 12 of the draft proposed
Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires plaintiff to describe both the
facts alleged and the evidence that supports those allegations. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, Discussion Draft
No. 4 (April 18, 2003). According to the comment, this provision requires detail like
that demanded by the former American code pleading regime rather than the notice
pleading of the Federal Rules.
28. Subrin, supra note 22, at 719.
29. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1998) (contrasting the role of the
judge in fact-gathering in continental judicial systems with the handling of such issues
in American litigation).
30. Id. at 1024.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45 (authorizing a subpoena on nonparties requiring them
to produce documentary evidence or appear for deposition testimony).
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opponent's case. ' '12
Although the framers of the Rules were aware of the risks of
abuse of this broad-ranging right granted to lawyers, allowing them to
employ the court's power to obtain information,33 it does not seem
that the more aggressive possibilities of the new procedure were
grasped at once. Meanwhile, amendments to the Rules further
liberalized the use of discovery. By the 1950s and 1960s, however,
lawyers had learned to use broad discovery, and the rapid
deployment of photocopiers during that period greatly expanded the
materials that could be sought using document requests.
Beginning in the 1970s, there was a strong reaction, and many
urged that "discovery abuse" had become a substantial problem.' At
first, there were proposals to respond to these concerns by building
limits into the Rules-narrowing the scope of discovery and imposing
numerical limitations on the use of various discovery devices.35 But
those proposed limitations were largely jettisoned, and in 1983 the
Rules were instead amended to direct the judge to take early and
active judicial control of discovery-judicial management of
litigation. 6  The proponents of rule-based limits on discovery
proclaimed themselves happy with this response."
Thus, the emergence of managerial judging-and its attendant
limitations on lawyer latitude-can be seen as a response to the great
broadening of that latitude effected by the adoption of the Federal
Rules. But before turning to the evolution of managerial judging,
another strand needs to be added.
IV. Substantive Inducements to Judicial Control:
The Rising Importance of "Public Law" Litigation
As noted above, the American judiciary is unusually (perhaps
uniquely) independent, and often receptive to new claims or new
remedies. We have also seen that, during the 1960s and 1970s, there
was an outburst of statutory expansion of rights, and that these rights
32. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Compare supra text at note 24
(discussing Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533 (1911)).
33. See Subrin, supra note 22, at 720-22.
34. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REv. 747,
752-53 (1998).
35. Id. at 753-60.
36. See id. at 760-64.
37. See id. at 764.
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were generally enforceable under the American private attorney
general technique.
These substantive developments contributed to the emergence of
increased judicial control of litigation; indeed, there was a sort of
synergy between the substantive and procedural changes. This
synergy was described most vividly in Professor Abram Chayes's
seminal 1976 article The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.8
Chayes began with what he called the "received tradition" of
American litigation, an individualistic enterprise that depended on
the parties' efforts and assumed the judge would take an active role:
The process is party-initiated and party-controlled. The case is
organized and the issues defined by exchanges between the parties.
Responsibility for fact development is theirs. The trial judge is a
neutral arbiter of their interactions who decides questions of law
only if they are put in issue by an appropriate move of a party.3 9
This approach to litigation broke down, he argued, due to the
rising importance of public law litigation: "Perhaps the dominating
characteristic of modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise
out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead,
the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory
policies.",,4
This description may overemphasize the importance of this form
of litigation, and it perhaps does not adequately recognize the
breadth of the concept of public law litigation." Nonetheless, it
38. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976).
39. Id. at 1283.
40. Id. at 1284.
41. See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 647, 668-82 (1988) (noting that other types of litigation-
including some mass tort litigation-could also be seen as imbued with public
interest) [hereinafter, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship]. Indeed, one of
the arguments about public access to discovery results in tort litigation is precisely
that there is a public interest in materials exchanged through discovery in "private"
litigation. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991
U. ILL. L. REv. 457 (describing arguments about the asserted public interest in such
litigation).
Recently, Professor Molot has affirmed that time has, in some ways, passed
Chayes's article by:
By the late 1990s, however, Professor Chayes's model itself was outdated. Chayes
may have succeeded in addressing the civil rights class actions of the 1960s and 1970s,
but he failed to anticipate and "capture the dynamics of modern mass tort litigation,"
which came to dominate the litigation landscape of the 1980s and 1990s.
[27:3
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captured some important aspects of a shift in the emphasis of
American procedure that followed from the increasing importance of
this kind of case. One is what Chayes called "the Triumph of
Equity"-the growing importance of equitable relief in cases that
called for federal judges to take responsibility for public institutions
such as school districts or prisons on a long-term basis. This changed
the focus of litigation: "Instead of a dispute retrospectively oriented
toward the consequences of a closed set of events, the court has a
controversy about future probabilities.
43
That shift to a prospective focus led to a second feature of the
new form of litigation, the changing character of fact-finding:"
The elaboration of a decree is largely a discretionary process within
which the trial judge is called upon to assess and appraise the
consequences of alternative programs that might correct the
substantive fault. In both the liability and remedial phases, the
relevant inquiry is largely the same: How can the policies of a
public law best be served in a concrete case?
45
A third distinctive characteristic of this new form of litigation
was the task of drafting such a decree.46 The legal norms sought to be
enforced do not themselves provide specifics that would be helpful to
the judge; the Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment does not, for example, specify what exact changes must
be made at a prison to improve the conditions of the inmates
sufficiently to satisfy the constitutional requirement. So judges had to
devise detailed decrees that would be workable for the parties. This
process necessarily involved an emphasis on cooperation and often
also the participation of many people in fashioning the specifics.
Judges themselves had begun, by this time, to appreciate that
these new types of cases called for a new type of judicial action.
Consider the views of a judge handling a major water pollution case
in which the critical questions were whether, and how, the court
might require the defendant to alter the operation of its plant to
Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 Yale L.J. 27,
29 (2003) (quoting Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The
New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 Val. U. L. Rev. 413, 414-15
(1999)).
42. Chayes, supra note 38, at 1292-96.
43. Id. at 1292.
44. Id. at 1296-98.
45. Id. at 1296-97.
46. See id. at 1298-1304.
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minimize pollution at a lake:
The role of the court in such a situation, because of the nature of
the proceedings and considerations which must be reviewed and
undertaken pursuant to the [water pollution] statute, transcends
ordinary civil litigation and makes a reviewing court more of an
administrative tribunal than a court in an ordinary adversary civil
47
case.
The net effect of these developments, thus, was to shift authority
from the lawyers to the judge. In Chayes's words:
The judge is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case,
and he draws for support not only on the parties and their counsel,
but on a wide range of outsiders-masters, experts, and oversight
personnel. Most important, the trial judge has increasingly become
the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief, which
have widespread effects on persons not before the court and
require the judge's continuing involvement in administration and
48implementation.
This shift in judicial behavior-what we now call managerial
judging-actually had a broader impact than Chayes seems to have
appreciated. As I have written elsewhere:
The features of public law litigation that prompted judicial efforts
to control litigation cannot meaningfully be limited to that kind of
litigation. As might have been expected, judges promptly applied
the lessons they had learned from their public law litigation
experiences outside that realm. Having found a significant public
interest in most civil litigation, judges reacted by taking charge of
ordinary cases in a way somewhat similar to that in which they had
taken control of the cases Chayes described.49
V. The Emergence of Managerial Judging
Although managerial judging came to flower during the last
quarter century, its roots lie much earlier, and in the state courts. The
pretrial conference, the device later used by federal judges to take
control of litigation from an early point, found its origins in a
procedure employed by the Circuit Court of Wayne County,
Michigan, in the 1930s." This practice called for the lawyers to meet
47. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408,413 (D. Minn. 1972).
48. Chayes, supra note 38, at 1284.
49. See Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, supra note 41, at 675.
50. See Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36
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with the trial judge after discovery was completed to supply the sort
of factual detail they were no longer required to include in the
pleadings, and to disclose how they intended to go about presenting
their case at trial. A study of pretrial conferences in the New Jersey
state courts in the 1960s concluded that pretrial conferences increased
the chance that the case would be well presented, eliminated
inefficiencies at trial, and improved the settlement process."
This sort of pretrial conference shortly before trial was
authorized but not required by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules from the
beginning. In the words of the Federal Rules drafting committee
Reporter, "[t]he judge finds out what the case is all about, how much
is admitted on each side, and how much not, and then he goes on to
the question of manner of proof."52 But the longstanding habits of
federal judges, combined with the master calendar system that
operated in many courts, meant that the process was limited to
interaction with the lawyers shortly before the trial, and after most or
all of the pretrial activity, particularly discovery, had been completed.
The stimulus for going beyond this activity was initially a growing
concern about large-scale litigation. In the late 1940s, an illustrious
committee, appointed to study the peculiar problems of "protracted
litigation," suggested that judicial control would be a suitable
reaction. 3 This work produced seminars for federal judges in the
1950s that emphasized the value of judicial control. 4 By 1960, one
district court judge was stressing the points that became widespread
over the ensuing thirty years:
The early and expeditious termination of a civil suit largely rests in
judicial supervision .. .that is primarily directed to see that the
claims at issue are prosecuted and brought to final termination
within such short time as due process, justice, and the reasonable
MICH. L. REV. 215 (1937).
51. See MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE
JUSTICE (1964).
52. Charles Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 167
(1956).
53. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee Report, Procedure
in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases (1951), reprinted in Hon. Leon R.
Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases: A Commentary on the Report Entitled
Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases Adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62 (1951).
54. See Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases
for United States Circuit and District Judges, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957); Hon. Alfred P.
Murrah, Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23
F.R.D. 319 (1958).
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interests of the litigants allow and the facts of the particular
litigation fairly permit. We must be mindful that, while
unreasonable delay should not be permitted, justice is essential.
Calendar control is but one phase of the judicial supervision to be
exercised over all civil litigation.55
Beginning in the 1960s, federal courts increasingly employed a
single assignment system, under which a case was assigned to a single
judge from the time it was filed. 6 With that innovation, judges could
use Rule 16 conferences to take early control of litigation. Many
judges began issuing orders in all civil cases requiring the lawyers to
meet for a status conference shortly after the suit was filed. At these
conferences, the judge might inquire about a variety of topics relevant
to the processing of the case, and endeavor to develop a discovery
plan. As one judge who favored vigorous use of this technique
explained, the judge could use the encounter to develop a sense of the
lawyers:
[T]he judge should consider his sense of the attorneys' diligence,
experience, and competence. Since a structured pretrial calendar
can force attorneys to prepare, even a simple case can benefit from
elaborate pretrial where the attorneys might otherwise allow the
case to fall into confusion. A judge should also be alert to the
particularly combative attorney who, if the case is not actively
managed during pretrial, might succeed in turning a trial that
should be a molehill into a mountain.57
Not only is the status conference an occasion for the judge to
assess the need to take active control of the lawyers' activities, it is
also an occasion for alerting them to the judge's insistence that they
toe the judge's line:
[C]ertain intangible benefits also flow from this early meeting of
attorneys and judge. The meeting itself warns the attorneys that
they have a vigilant judge, and it may therefore prod attorneys who
might otherwise be less than diligent into transferring the case to
their "active" files .... In short, the status conference is usually the
first personal contact between the judge and the attorneys, and the
judge can use his considerable influence to set the tone of a
55. Hon. Sylvester J. Ryan, Effect of Calendar Control on the Disposition of
Litigation, 28 F.R.D. 66, 67 (1960).
56. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 494, 522-23 & n.127 (1986).
57. Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770, 781 (1981).
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relationship in which he and the attorneys are likely to be engaged
for the duration of the litigation."
It should be apparent that judges doing this sort of assessment
have moved far beyond the passive arbiter of an earlier era, and that
they necessarily constrain attorneys' latitude as they pursue this sort
of judicial management of litigation. And it should also be apparent
from the undercurrent of impatience with attorneys that judges
inclined to act this way were less likely to defer to what the lawyers
wanted than judges had been in an earlier era.
In the 1970s this activity was only pursued by a limited number of
judges, however. Some of these judges proselytized, both with their
brethren on the bench and with the rulemakers. In 1983, this effort
led to changes to Rule 16. Where formerly the rule was entirely
permissive and focused on planning when a trial was imminent, after
Rule 16 was amended in 1983, it required judges to set schedules for
certain things soon after the suit was filed,59 and authorized them to
inquire into and make orders about a large variety of other topics.
6°
In 1993, additional rule changes mandated an early meeting of the
attorneys and required that they develop a discovery plan and submit
a report to the judge about the needs of the case before the
scheduling order could be issued.61
In sum, these changes in rules and judicial orientation meant that
attorneys who had formerly had great latitude before trial to
approach things as they pleased could no longer proceed without
constraint.62 And the stimulus was largely the expansion of moves
58. Id. at 782.
59. See FED. R. Ov. P. 16(b).
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
62. Another development of the same era has been increased emphasis by judges
on settlement promotion. Although that activity by judges may in some instances
constrain litigation activity by the lawyers, in general it is welcomed by lawyers and
therefore not really an instance of judicial limitation on the freedom of action of the
lawyers. See Wayne Brazil, What Lawyers Want from Judges in the Settlement Area,
106 F.R.D. 85, 85 (1985) (describing survey of lawyers showing that "in
overwhelming numbers, litigators say judges should get actively involved in
settlement negotiations in most cases in federal court").
Another major event in U.S. civil procedure that might be included in a
discussion of the constraints judges wield over lawyers in the increased prominence
of FED. R. Civ. P. 11, which authorizes judges to punish lawyers for making
groundless claims or arguments. This rule was substantially amended in 1983, and
the resulting increase in judicial activity produced controversy and assertions that it
was working a "transformation" of American litigation. See Stephen Burbank, The
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available to lawyers under the expansive Federal Rules.63
VI. The American Critique of Managerial Judging
Many lawyers chafe under the recently developed and
increasingly intrusive judicial attitudes, and a number of academics
have challenged the wisdom and propriety of this new form of judicial
behavior.6' Exhaustive examination of these criticisms is beyond the
scope of this paper, but it is important to identify and comment
briefly on several.
(1) Does Judicial Management Constrain Lawyers Too Much?
We have already seen that private enforcement of public norms
is an important feature of litigation in America.65 If judicial control of
private lawyers unduly limits their ability to pursue and expose
wrongdoing, it would undercut the assumption that their activity is a
suitable method of enforcing those public norms. As Dean
Carrington pointed out several years ago:
Private litigants do in America much of what is done in other
industrial states by public officers working within an administrative
bureaucracy. Every day, hundreds of American lawyers caution
their clients that an unlawful course of conduct will be accompanied
by serious risk of exposure at the hands of some hundreds or
thousands of lawyers, each armed with a subpoena power by which
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1925 (1989). But the rule was amended again in 1993 to retract many of its
most aggressive provisions, and to build in additional procedural protections against
inappropriate imposition of sanctions. So it no longer seems to be of equal
importance.
Another rule change that might appear to invite more aggressive court
involvement is the addition to Rule 26 of the "proportionality" provision now
contained in Rule 26(b)(2). Although this directive to the judge to limit or forbid
excessive discovery appears to call for aggressive judicial effort, in fact it has not
produced much. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, § 2008.1 at 121 (2d ed. 1994) (reporting that the addition of these
provisions to the rules "seems to have created only a ripple in the caselaw").
63. See Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 266 (1985) (urging that increased judicial management was
designed to "assist in restoring the health of the system," and that a judge who
adhered to the "passive night watchman" role of former times no longer could do so).
64. For the most prominent example of academic criticism, see Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). For a recent and extended critique,
see Molot, supra note 41.
65. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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misdeeds can be uncovered. Unless corresponding new powers are
conferred on public officers, constricting discovery would diminish
the disincentives for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum of
forbidden conduct.66
For other nations, of course, this concern may not exist or may
not be important. In Europe, for example, governmental officials
reportedly wield investigative authority that far outstrips U.S.
discovery techniques.67 Unless other countries correspondingly rely
on private enforcement to accomplish public goals, concern about
constraining private lawyers may be insignificant. But even in the
United States there seems limited risk that this sort of constriction of
discovery is imminent.'
When the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules embarked in 1996
on its Discovery Project (a comprehensive review of discovery
practices in the American federal courts), one of the desires it
repeatedly encountered was that judges exercise more "parental
69
supervision" over discovery. When the Federal Judicial Center
surveyed lawyers in 1997, it found that the most popular solution to
discovery problems they endorsed was "increasing court
management/availability of judges to rule on discovery disputes.
71
The second most popular approach was "increasing
sanctions/adopting civility code.",71 When asked to identify the most
promising approach for reducing discovery problems, by far the
largest number of those surveyed opted to "increase judicial case
66. Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997).
67. For example, Philip Shishkin, European Regulators Spark Controversy with
"Dawn Raids," WALL ST. J., March 1, 2002, at Al, describes surprise evidence-
gathering activities of European Union antitrust investigators. Without any advance
judicial authorization, "EU antitrust agents can walk without warning into any
company doing business in the 15-nation union to look for whatever they think might
be proof of illegal activity." American discovery, by way of contrast, requires notice
and a right to object and judicial review of the objections before the discovery goes
forward.
68. I have elaborated on this point in Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American
Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TULANE J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 153 (1999) (concluding that, despite numerous efforts to curtail
excessive discovery, American discovery remains qualitatively different from that in
other countries).
69. I served as Special Reporter of the Advisory Committee in connection with
its Discovery Project and recall repeated instances in which lawyers voiced such
concerns.
70. Thomas Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery Under the 1993
Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C, L. REV. 525, 587 tbl. 36 (1998).
71. Id.
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management. 7 2 These results hardly indicate that there is currently a
severe problem with constraining lawyers' pursuit of cases.
A related consideration that might warrant note is that even
though lawyers do not think that there is a problem with increased
judicial supervision, clients could so object. We have no data on that,
but there is some reason to think that litigants emphasize procedures
that give them control over the litigation.73 Because lawyers are, in
theory, obliged by rules of ethics and professional responsibility to
follow the directions of their clients, one could view constraints on the
lawyers' activities as intruding unduly on the ability of clients to direct
their own cases. However, this concern seems an improbable ground
for criticizing judicial regulation of lawyers' litigation activities. For
one thing, "lawyer-client relations are more often perfunctory and
superficial than intimate; . . . the locus of control is shifting toward
lawyers rather than clients .... [L]itigants are frequently only names
to both lawyers and court personnel ....7 4 Moreover, as a general
matter, American law assumes that the lawyer should play the leading
role in the activities that case management regulates:
It is common experience that attorneys and their clients frequently
differ and even violently disagree between or among themselves
with reference to the conduct of the procedure that should relate to
the trial of the action. However, it is well established law that the
attorney has complete charge and supervision of the procedure that
is to be adopted and pursued in the trial of an action .... 75
(2) Does Judicial Management Unduly Interfere with the Adversary
System?
The adversary system is said to be a distinctive feature of
American and English civil procedure, so that harming it might seem
unimportant to those in the rest of the world. But that American
assumption may well be too facile. Professor Langbein, for example,
has argued that German civil procedure is similarly adversarial except
72. Id. at 587 tNl. 37.
73. See, e.g., Laurens Walker et al., The Relation Between Procedural and
Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1416 (1979) (reporting on psychological
experiments that indicate that participants preferred those procedures that gave them
personal control over the proceedings).
74. Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989
U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92.
75. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 81 P.2d 913, 917 (Cal.
1938).
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that the principal authority for gathering the evidence rests with the
judge. 6 And American case management increasingly includes early
regulation of the conduct of the trial. So the concern may be of
greater interest to others than might initially appear.
The fear is that, by becoming deeply involved in the litigation at
an early stage, the judge may impair his ability to act with
impartiality:
The extensive information that judges receive during pretrial
conferences has not been filtered by the rules of evidence. Some of
this information is received ex parte, a process that deprives the
opposing party of the opportunity to contest the validity of
information received. Moreover, judges are in close contact with
attorneys during the course of management. Such interactions may
become occasions for development of intense feelings-admiration,
friendship, or antipathy.77
Indeed, it could be argued that the process of fashioning a
management program for litigation itself will interfere with the need
for the judge to keep an open mind until all the information is
gathered. In the words of Professor Fuller's classic study endorsing
the adversary method:
[F]ailure generally attends the attempt to dispense with the distinct
roles traditionally implied by adjudication. What generally occurs
in practice is that at some early point a familiar pattern will seem to
emerge from the evidence; an accustomed label is wanting for the
case and, without awaiting further proofs, this label is promptly
assigned to it. It is a mistake to suppose that this premature
cataloguing must necessarily result from impatience, prejudice, or
mental sloth. Often it proceeds from a very understandable desire
to bring the hearing into some order and coherence, for without
some tentative theory of the case there is no standard of relevance
by which testimony may be measured....
An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for
combating this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in
76. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823 (1985). There are other views on this question. See, e.g., W. Zeidler,
Evaluation of the Adversary System: As Comparison, Some Remarks on the
Investigatory System of Procedure, 55 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 390, 394 (1981) (asserting
that, "to our English colleagues the German judge will seem highly vocal and
dominant whereas counsel will appear to act with somewhat subdued adversary
zeal").
77. Resnik, supra note 64, at 427.
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terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. The
arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension
between two opposing interpretations of it. While the proper
classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is time to
18
explore all of its peculiarities and nuances.
These are forceful arguments, but they can be forcefully
countered. For one thing, the sorts of topics that are usually the
subject of regulation by judicial management-the timing of trial
preparation and the scope of far-reaching discovery-do not
inherently create the sorts of risks posed by Fuller. Moreover, unless
there is to be no judicial oversight of the lawyers at all, some judicial
assessment of these matters appears essential. So one can conclude
that Fuller's concerns are overstated if applied to judicial
management, which was not his focus.
Beyond that, Fuller's objections may fail to deal with the reality
emphasized by a judicial proponent of management-that American
judges are often called upon to segregate pieces of a proceeding in
their minds:
Impartiality is a capacity of mind-a learned ability to recognize
and compartmentalize the relevant from the irrelevant and to
detach one's emotions from one's rational faculties. Only because
we trust judges to be able to satisfy those obligations do we permit
them to exercise such power and oversight. On the basis of this
trust, we permit the same judge who presides over a pretrial
suppression hearing [in a criminal case], where defendants may
solemnly proclaim their ownership of the seized evidence in order
to establish their standing, to sit in the subsequent trial and issue
further rulings.79
As this judge concludes, "there is nothing sacrosanct about the
adversarial system."'
For those whose systems are a good deal less adversarial than the
American model, presumably the risk that the judge might be
affected by early exposure to the case has not proved an
insurmountable difficulty.
78. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
383 (1978).
79. Peckham, supra note 63, at 262-63.
80. Id. at 265.
[27:3
Reining in the American Litigator
(3) Does Judicial Management Give Judges Too Much Power?
As noted earlier, the constraints on district court judges have
waned in the era of managerial judging. Indeed, this activity
inherently involves ad hoc determinations about how a case should be
handled, and these decisions are relatively immune to review by other
judges. Other judicial systems presume much greater authority to
review such decisions by first level judicial officers. 8 And it cannot be
denied that in some cases judicial scheduling seems dubious at best.8
I have recently examined this concern with care,8 and doubt that
it is significant in comparison to the value of judicial restraint on
lawyers' use of the very substantial new latitude that modem
American procedure gives them. Although one might worry that
judges would indulge their attitudes toward the validity of various
types of claims before them, that concern seems modest. The very
reason that timing decisions are delegated to trial court judges is that
they are largely divorced from the underlying substance of the case.
There is limited ground for concluding that procedural discretion has
been wielded to serve judges' substantive agendas with much
frequency.' There hardly seems a widespread uprising of lawyers
asserting that federal judges as a group are regularly using their
procedural discretion to advance their substantive preferences.85 As a
81. See MIRJAN R. DAMA9KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY,
48-49 (1986) (describing more intensive review of all aspects of a lower court's
decision-making as a matter of course in some judicial systems).
82. For an illustration, consider Otero v. Buslee, 695 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1982),
in which both plaintiff and defendant had made summary judgment motions and, as a
result, did not initiate discovery. When the district court did not resolve the summary
judgment motions, defendant filed a motion asking the court to extend the cutoff
date for discovery until the summary judgment motions were decided, but the district
court did not decide that motion, either, before the discovery cutoff passed. It then
denied all motions, and defendant objected to being denied discovery after losing at
trial. The appellate court held that defendant could not complain about being denied
"belated" discovery. One might argue that this conjunction of developments made
the district court's actions so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion, but
the appellate court's attitude was that defendant took its chances by failing to initiate
its discovery before the discovery cutoff even though that discovery would be wasted
if either summary judgment motion were granted.
83. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming 2003).
84. See Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for
the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 362 (1975) (asserting that "it is
not at all obvious that judges who think they have discretion will give freer rein to
their personal preferences than those who do not").
85. Indeed, it may be that individual ideological differences make less difference
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consequence, although the theoretical potential exists for such
activity, that potential need not lead one to endorse aggressive
remedial measures presently.
86
(4) Do Managerial Judges Require Lawyers To Do Too Much
Wasted Work?
It is undeniable that judicial management can force a lawyer to
do more work than would be done otherwise, or to do it sooner than
would be done otherwise. Indeed, that may be one of the court's
objectives, since management can overcome a lawyer's tendency to be
lazy about full and prompt preparation of the case. 7 In the federal
district court in San Francisco, for example, there has long been a
requirement that the lawyers prepare an elaborate pretrial statement
as trial approaches so that the judge can use it in fashioning a final
pretrial order. The former chief judge of that court recognized that
lawyers had reasons for resisting this requirement:
Many attorneys feel that such orders are, in effect, analogous to the
much-maligned code and common law pleading systems that once
prevailed in this country, and are therefore contrary to the spirit of
simplicity embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Some
members of the bar also feel that many judges use burdensome
pretrial orders as a wedge for settlement and that such rules have
little to do with simplification of the issues for trial.8
Sometimes appellate courts agree with this sort of objection and
denounce what they view as unduly demanding pretrial requirements:
Ours is an adversary system of justice. Local Rule 2.08 is
inquisitorial in tone and purpose. In our system lawyers worry
about the whereabouts of witnesses. The court does not. Lawyers
than other factors. Researchers who used psychological techniques to design and
evaluate a survey of U.S. Magistrate Judges reported "a more fundamental source of
systematic error: wholly apart from political orientation and self-interest, the very
nature of human thought can induce judges to make consistent or predictable
mistakes in particular situations." Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777,780 (2001).
86. Perhaps this is an appropriate point to mention that an alternative to judge-
designed methods for each case would be to prescribe an overall schedule for all
litigation. California tried something like that for its state courts, implementing what
it called a "fast track" for civil litigation. The strictness and rigidity of this approach
caused numerous complaints from lawyers. See Richard L. Marcus, Malaise of the
Litigation Superpower, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 71, 103-08 (Adrian A.S.
Zuckerman ed., 1999).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 57 and 58.
88. Peckham, supra note 57, at 787.
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worry about proof. The court does not-except in the rare case of
collusion. Lawyers get the case ready for trial. The court does not.
Local Rule 2.08 subordinates the rule of the lawyer to that of the
administering magistrate, reducing counsel to the role of clerical
assistants who are to anticipate imaginatively what other matters
ought to be embraced within an endless pretrial order.
A comprehensive study of case management by the RAND
Corporation in the mid 1990s gave support to concerns about
unnecessary expense and activity as a result of case management.
Based on a review of thousands of cases in twenty judicial districts,
this study concluded:
Early judicial management has significant effects on both time and
cost. We estimate a 1.5 to 2 month reduction in median time to
disposition for cases that last at least nine months, and an
approximately 20-hour increase in lawyer work hours. Our data
show that the costs to litigants are also higher in dollar terms and in
litigant hours spent when cases are managed early. These results
debunk the myth that reducing time to disposition will necessarily
reduce litigation costs.90
For a long time, there has been a question about whether case
management "works," in the sense that it reduced the expenditure of
both time and money on litigation." Under these circumstances,
there is continuing reason to worry that the tradeoffs might not be
worth the cost. But it is worth noting that this critique is not based on
the inherent desirability of freedom of action by lawyers, but the
concern that curtailing that freedom of action actually increases
overall costs of litigation. And it could be that case management also
improves the quality of litigation. That was the conclusion four
decades ago about pretrial practices in the New Jersey state courts,
92
and it is not something that a study like RAND's could measure.
(5) Is Case Management Too Informal?
In traditional American litigation, the judge does not get
89. McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 1976).
90. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN
EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT 14 (1996).
91. For a review of the question, see Richard L. Marcus, "Deja Vu All Over
Again"? An American Reaction to the Woolf Report, in REFORM OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 219,232-35 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds., 1995).
92. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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involved unless and until the parties made a motion. The procedure
for such motions is fairly consistent across courts. The moving party
files a memorandum arguing that the motion should be granted,
perhaps supported by affidavits. Then the responding party may do
the same, and sometimes after that the moving party gets a chance to
reply in writing to the opposing papers. Only then is there a hearing,
and the arguments made at the hearing should follow from the points
made in the papers filed with the court.
When they manage cases, judges often encounter issues that
might be the subject of a motion-particularly a discovery motion-
and resolve them without the formal presentation that attends a
motion. Informal resolution often saves time and money, particularly
if the alternative is insistence that a formal motion be filed. But
neither the lawyers nor the judge has as much time to reflect on the
arguments or issues in an informal setting. As a very thoughtful
magistrate judge has noted, this manner of proceeding may
sometimes produce decisions that are not as good as they would be if
done in the normal way:
Prompt rulings can save parties considerable expense and expedite
the pretrial process. But the depth of consideration, by both
counsel and the neutral, is necessarily limited. I have been forced
to acknowledge that fact by parties urging reconsideration of my
tentative discovery rulings. In some instances my initial instinct
was misplaced, the situation was more complex than I appreciated,
and after more careful consideration I have reversed my original
decision.... I have become more sensitive to the dangers inherent
in speedy and wholly oral proceedings. 93
VII. Conclusion: Whither Case Management in America?
In the United States, many are anxious to avoid "judicial
activism." Yet it can be said that "[m]anagement is a new form of
'judicial activism."' 94 But despite the general criticisms of judicial
activism, the trend toward case management in America does not
appear to be abating. In 1990, for example, Congress declared itself
in support of case management. 95  Indeed, if anything, case
93. Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary
or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 420 (1986).
94. Resnik, supra note 64, at 380.
95. In connection with adopting the Civil Justice Reform Act, the Senate
Judiciary Committee (which originated the legislation) explained in its official report
that the Act sought to implement the "benefits of enhanced case management"
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management's impact seems to be expanding. We are told that it is
spreading beyond our shores.'
At the same time, the debate in the United States about the
desirability of American-style litigation continues.97 In addition, it
seems that other countries may be gravitating toward developments
in litigation that make it more like America's. Thus, we have recently
been told that China,98 Russia" and even Japan"° may see a change in
frequency or type of litigation. And lawyers in some countries are
gaining some tools that resemble the ones American lawyers have
long had to pursue their cases. We in America have learned, for
example, that in Japan there is now some opportunity to do
discovery."' Some urge that civil law systems will soon have to
include some discovery in their menu of procedural offerings."°
Although few other countries-if any-are likely to embrace the
private enforcement model that makes private litigation so important
in the United States, the trend-line nevertheless seems inclined
toward increased lawyer latitude in many countries. If the American
experience is any indication, that may be accompanied by greater
reliance on judges to supervise these lawyers. If so, it would seem in
keeping with the general inclination of civil law systems to authorize
because "greater and earlier judicial control over civil cases yields faster rates of
disposition." S. REP. No. 101-416, at 16 (1990).
96. For example, England has recently embarked on a revised procedure for civil
cases based on a 1995-96 study by Lord Woolf, whose Final Report devotes its first
substantive section to case management. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE § II
(1996). He began by declaring that "the introduction of case management [is] crucial
for the changes which are necessary in our civil justice system." Id. at 14.
97. See CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA (2003)
(arguing that American litigation is desirable because it has permitted victims to shift
the cost of accidents to wrongdoers).
98. See, e.g., Banking on Growth, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 2003, at 67 (reporting
that China's highest court "said that shareholders could file individual or class-action
lawsuits against companies that lie about their accounts").
99. See Steven Lee Myers, Russians Become Litigious: Survivors of Theater Siege
Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, at A3.
100. See Carl Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan's Changing
View Towards Civil Litigation, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 769 (2001).
101. See Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil Procedure in Comparative Law
Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 694 (1998); Toshiro M. Mochizuki, Baby Step or
Giant Leap?: Parties' Expanded Access to Documentary Evidence Under the New
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 285 (1999).
102. See Kuo-Chang Huang, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW (2003)
(contending that the lack of discovery in civil law systems results in inaccuracy,
unfairness, and inefficiency, and that it is therefore necessary for continental civil
procedure to introduce some form of discovery).
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greater judicial control over the proceedings and the lawyers than was
traditionally true in the United States. In that sense, then, America is
falling in line with the rest of the world, not the other way around.
But as with discovery, 3 there is likely still to be a gulf between the
reality of the American lawyer and the experiences of lawyers
elsewhere.
103. See Marcus, supra note 68.
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